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H1 - Introduction 
 
After a 40-minute drive on the back of a motorbike, passing numerous military and police 
checkpoints, my guide suddenly stops. “From this moment on we do not take any photos and do 
not ask any questions anymore. Follow me and do what I say”, he tells me. We are on our way to 
the illegal gold mine ‘Doka’. Not to be found on any map, the mine is located between cocoa and 
palm plantations not far from the village of Hire, a rural town in Côte d’Ivoire. While the mine is 
on the exploration ground of an international mining company, it is, according to local villagers, 
being controlled by Lieutenant-Colonel Issiaka Ouattara, a former rebel who in January 2017 got 
promoted to commander-in-chief of the Republican Guard. Walking past the remains of an ash 
burnt campement, we enter the mining pit. Under the eye of a handful of armed forces, more than a 
thousand miners dig into a 40-meter pit, kept together by self-constructed wooden shafts. As soon 
as the guards spot ‘le blanc’ or white man, we are asked to leave the terrain, because they are afraid 
that we take photos or shoot video recordings of the activity. Later when I return to the village, 
others warn me not to return there. “People have been killed there”, explains an employee of the 
local mining company. When I ask my guide, a former miner, why he worked at Doka, he says: 
“there is not much other work and this provides good money”.  
 
There is no agreed upon definition of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). In policy, it defined 
differently from country-to-country, according to a range of criteria.  But in general terms, it is 
thought of as “mining by individuals, groups, families or cooperatives with minimal or no 
mechanization, often in the informal (illegal) sector of the market” (Hentschel, Hruschka, & 
Priester, 2003, p. 5). In some countries, a distinction is made between ‘artisanal mining’ or purely 
manual activity on the one hand, and ‘small-scale mining’ or activity with some mechanization on 
the other hand. Often, the terms ‘artisanal mining’ and ‘small-scale mining’ are used 
interchangeably. In the last two decades, the number of people engaged in ASM has increased 
rapidly worldwide, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Hilson & Hilson, 2015). While the often-
informal status of the sector makes it particularly hard to gather sufficient and reliable data, it is 
estimated that it provides direct employment to tens of millions of people in more than 40 countries 
and provides a livelihood for more than 100 million others who indirectly depend on the sector 
for their survival (ILO, 1999; Banchirigah, 2006). Moreover, in terms of contribution to worldwide 
mineral production, it is estimated that significant shares originate from ASM. An estimation of 
the sector’s production levels in 2007 is provided in Figure 1.1, based on the data of Wagner et al. 
(2007).  In sub-Saharan Africa, it is estimated that over eight million people are employed in the 
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sector directly, and more than 46 million others rely on it for their livelihood (see Table 1). As is 
the case in a number of countries in the region, in Côte d’Ivoire, the focus of this thesis, ASM 
formally holds an illegal status. The government maintains that despite being virtually non-existent 
in 1999, the beginning of a period of prolonged political instability in the country, the ASM sector 
today employs at least 500,000 unlicensed operators nationwide. (The Economist, 2016).  
 
While the ASM sector contributes significantly to production and employment, it is more often 
associated with its negative social and environmental impacts. Common environmental impacts 
Table 1 - Employment estimates for artisanal and small-scale mining, and minerals extracted, in 
selected developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
Country 
Directly working in 
artisanal and small-
scale mining  
Estimated number 
of dependents 
Main minerals mined on a small 
and artisanal scale 
    
Angola  150.000   900.000  Diamonds 
Burkina Faso  200.000   1.000.000  Gold 
Central African Republic  400.000   2.400.000  Gold, diamonds 
Chad  100.000   600.000  Gold 
Côte d'Ivoire  100.000   600.000  Gold, diamonds 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo  200.000   1.200.000  Diamonds, gold, coltan 
Eritrea  400.000   2.400.000  Gold 
Ethiopia  500.000   3.000.000  Gold 
Ghana  1.100.000   4.400.000  Gold, diamonds, sand 
Guinea  300.000   1.500.000  Gold, diamonds 
Liberia  100.000   600.000  Gold, diamonds 
Madagascar  500.000   2.500.000  Coloured gemstones, gold 
Malawi  40.000   240.000  Coloured gemstones, gold 
Mali  400.000   2.400.000  Gold 
Mozambique  100.000   1.200.000  Coloured gemstones, gold 
Niger  450.000   2.700.000  Gold 
Nigeria  500.000   2.500.000  Gold 
South Africa  20.000   120.000  Gold 
Sierra Leone  300.000   1.800.000  Gold, diamonds, coltan 
South Sudan  200.000   1.200.000  Gold 
Tanzania  1.500.000   9.000.000  Coloured gemstones, gold, diamonds 
Uganda  150.000   900.000  Gold 
Zimbabwe  500.000   3.000.000  Gold, diamonds, coloured gemstones 
From Hilson & Maconachie (2017)   
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include pollution through the use of mercury, which is used to amalgamate gold, deforestation and 
defacement of land; air pollution; and erosion and other forms of land degradation (Hilson, 2002a; 
Aryee et al.; 2003; Kitula, 2006). Other scholars have drawn attention to how high levels of child 
labour in ASM are interlinked with the lack of formal employment opportunities in the region and 
the need for children to provide financial support to their impoverished families (Hilson, 2010).The 
impact of mercury pollution on human health has been studied extensively(Tschakert and Singha, 
2007); the sector’s association with prostitution and criminal activities examined (Duffy, 2005; 
Banchirigah, 2006); its links to civil wars explored (Le Billon, 2005); and its potential connection 
with money laundering and supporting of terrorist activities discussed (Even-Zohar, 2003). These 
negative impacts have caught the attention of journalists, government officials and, to some extent, 
international donors, many of whom consequently view the activities of the sector extremely 
negatively (Hilson & McQuilken, 2014).  
Source: (Wagner et al., 2007) 
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Figure 1.1 - Estimation of the share of ASM in the global production of 
selected minerals and metals
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But a case can be made that these negative environmental and social impacts are ‘expressions’ of 
the sector’s informality, specifically, direct consequences of its current development trajectory. In 
the case of sub-Saharan Africa, because most ASM activity is unlicensed, the sector remains 
unmonitored and financed through illicit channels. Due to a lack of security of land tenure and 
their struggles to accumulate income and improve their livelihoods, ASM operators are often more 
focused on securing their daily needs, rather than prioritizing the management of what the general 
public, donors and policymakers see as the negative impacts of their activities. Without few 
possibilities to secure formal finance and appropriate equipment, people immersed in the sector 
often find themselves trapped in a vicious circle of poverty (see Figure 1.2) (Hilson & McQuilken, 
2014).  As a result of this extremely one-sided portrayal of the sector, its positive impacts, namely 
its contribution to employment and production, are often overlooked.   
 
Figure 1.2 - The ASM poverty trap 
Source: Hilson and Pardie, 2006 
In their efforts to come to grips with the expansion of ASM, many governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa have been looking for ways to better regulate the sector’s operations. However, this has 
proved challenging because, as noted, most of the ASM activity occurs outside of the regulatory 
framework of the state in ‘informal spaces’ (e.g. Geenen, 2012; Spiegel, 2015; Verbrugge, 2015). 
Formalization is often projected as the ‘magic bullet’ to both decrease the negative impacts and 
maximize  the developmental impact of the sector. Countries such as Ghana (e.g. Hilson & Potter, 
2005), Mali (e.g. Hilson & Garforth, 2012), the DRC (Geenen, 2012), Burkina Faso (e.g. 
Werthmann, 2009), Liberia (Van Bockstael, 2014) and Tanzania (e.g. Fisher, 2008) have in recent 
decades attempted to gain better control of the sector by implementing comprehensive plans to 
formalize it. International institutions and organizations such as the World Bank and the United 
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Nations (UN) have intensified calls for formalizing ASM. According to Hilson and Maconachie 
(2017) this increased attention is explained by a growing recognition of the sector’s economic 
impact, a greater need by governments to gain control of sprawling activities and the importance 
of putting regulators in an improved position to tackle the host of environmental and social 
problems that are associated with the sector. However, in cases such as Ghana (Hilson and Hilson, 
2015), Uganda (Siegel and Veiga, 2009), and Niger (Goumandakoye and Hilson, 2016) informality 
continues to persist in the sector, despite efforts to regularise operations (Siwale and Siwale, 2017), 
leaving individuals who find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty. Consequently, the 
current state of ASM in sub-Saharan Africa is largely informal, environmentally-degrading and 
characterized by poor working conditions (Hilson and McQuilken, 2014). The question is, of 
course, why?  
 
Following the footsteps of their neighbouring countries in a bid to attract foreign investment to 
develop the large-scale mining industry, the government of Côte d’Ivoire adopted a new Mining 
Code in 2014, which aims to “modernize the mining sector and improve transparency” (Shearman, 
2014). With fluctuating cocoa prices, hitting a four-year low in February 2017 (CNBC, 2017), the 
country has in recent years sought to be less dependant on the agricultural sector and is therefore 
diversifying its economy. Because a third of West Africa’s Birimian Greenstone Belt, a mineral-rich 
geological formation that stretches from Ghana to Senegal, is located within the country, it is 
thought that there might be more gold in Côte d’Ivoire than in neighbouring Ghana, which is, after 
South Africa, the continent’s leading producer of the precious metal (The Guardian, 2014). This 
untapped and underexploited potential, the Birimian Greenstone Belt, has attracted numerous 
mining companies interested in exploiting its manganese, iron ore, nickel, bauxite and, of course, 
gold. A significant component of the new Mining Code is the “Programme National de Rationalisation 
de l’Orpaillage (PNRO)”, which is specifically aimed at “cleaning up, better organizing and 
regulating” the country’s artisanal gold mining sector over the period 2013-2016.  
 
In a region where informal ASM has been growing rapidly in recent years, but governments efforts 
have struggled to regulate activities effectively, it is important to question why these efforts have 
been unsuccessful and what has been learned from previous experiences, in order to adopt a more 
effective ASM policy framework and to be able to let people escape the ASM poverty trap. As will 
be explained in this thesis, many of the mining sector reforms implemented in sub-Saharan Africa 
were made at the expense of an effective ASM policy framework, forcing the sector to remain and 
even grow in the informal economy (Hilson & McQuilken, 2014). Since Côte d’Ivoire is a country 
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that only recently implemented major mining sector reforms, its government finds itself in an 
enviable position to reflect on, and learn from, the experiences of other countries in the region. 
The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to broaden understanding of the ASM formalisation experience 
in Côte d’Ivoire, with special emphasis on the experiences surrounding the PNRO, the country’s 
most recent ASM policy framework. It specifically integrates the following research question:  
 
 RQ: What approach has been taken to formalise ASM in Côte d’Ivoire, and why has this 
approach been (in)effective?  
 
Qualitative data, drawn from interviews with miners, policymakers, donors and international 
organizations, were compiled over a period of three months of fieldwork in Côte d’Ivoire. These 
qualitative data offer insights into the experiences around the formalization of ASM in in Côte 
d’Ivoire, in the process providing a foundation for a largely-unexplored country case in sub-Saharan 
Africa. These findings could help donors and policymakers to adopt a more effective ASM policy 
framework, and contribute to a better understanding of why ASM often persists in informal 
‘spaces’ in sub-Saharan Africa. Most efforts to formalise ASM  in sub-Saharan Africa have proved 
ineffective. Is the Côte d’Ivoire experience any different? 
 
This thesis is structured as follows. In the next chapter a review of the literature is provided. It 
focuses on the theoretical underpinnings of informality and formalisation literature in general. This 
helps to contextualise how formalisation is understood and what it is expected to do. The second 
part of the chapter will critically examine formalisation in the context of ASM in sub-Saharan 
Africa, focussing mainly on the ideas which underpin the Legalist school. Building on the ideas of 
Hilson et al. (2017) shaped by those of Hernando De Soto, a Peruvian economist and most 
influential thinker within the Legalist school, a theoretical framework is constructed. In Chapter 3 
the research design and methodology are presented. Chapters 4 and 5 introduce the empirical part 
of the study and are structured on the basis of the theoretical framework. Chapter 6, the final 
chapter, presents the conclusions, critical reflections on the work and prescribes recommendations 
for further research.   
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Chapter 2
Formalizing Artisanal and Small-scale Mining 
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H2 – Formalizing Artisanal and Small-scale Mining  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature relevant to the formalisation of ASM in sub-
Saharan Africa. The chapter will deal with the concepts of the informal economy, the formal 
regulatory framework and formalization. The first part of the chapter presents the different 
theoretical underpinnings of informality, focussing specifically on the ideas of Hernando De Soto. 
These ideas are relevant because they provide insights on how the informal economy is linked to 
the formal regulatory framework. The chapter continues with explaining how formalisation is 
understood in different contexts. Following Siwale and Siwale (2017), a distinction between the 
narrow understanding and broad understanding of formalisation is made. Finally, formalization in 
the specific context of ASM in sub-Saharan Africa will be discussed. This final part of the chapter 
will explain how the ASM policy framework came about and how this is connected to the informal 
status of ASM in the region, further developing the theoretical framework of Hilson et al. (2017).  
 
2.1 The informal economy 
 
It is estimated that about two-thirds of the world’s labour force is found in the so-called informal 
economy (World Bank, 2009), defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as “all 
forms of ‘informal employment’—that is, employment without labour or social protection—both 
inside and outside informal enterprises, including both self-employment in small unregistered 
enterprises and wage employment in unprotected job” (Chen, 2005). The main characteristics of 
employment in the informal economy include low wages, levels of education and rates of literacy, 
high rates of poverty and long working hours. Businesses in the informal economy are often small-
scale, production of goods and services is labour-intensive and skills required for the business 
activities are usually gained outside formal education (Verick, 2008). While it has long been 
assumed that the informal economy consisted of individuals who chose to avoid registration and 
thereby taxation, it is now generally agreed in the literature that most informal workers operate 
outside the legal framework with costs rather than benefits, lacking secure work, workers’ benefits, 
social protection and representation or voice (Chen, 2005). Another important characteristic of the 
sector is that it does not consist of a homogeneous group of people. Often a distinction is made 
between informal employers, informal employees, people who operate on their own account, 
casual wage workers and industrial outworkers or homeworkers (see Figure 2.1). The ILO estimates 
the size of the sector to be 41% of the Gross National Income (GNI) of countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, ranging from 30% in South Africa to 60% in Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.  
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Figure 2.1: Model of Informal Employment: Hierarchy of Earnings & Poverty Risk by Employment Status and Sex 
Source: Chen (2012) 
 
Approximately 40% of Côte d’Ivoire’s GNI originates from the informal economy (see Figure 2.2) 
(Verick, 2008; Schneider, 2002). It is estimated that 93% of all new jobs created in sub-Saharan 
Africa during the 1990s were in the informal economy (Chen, 2001). This means that the informal 
economy not only contributes significantly to the size of national economies in sub-Saharan Africa 
but also provides work for a very large and heterogeneous group of often marginalized people.  
 
One of the central issues in the debate about the informal economy is how and whether it is linked 
with the formal economy. As Chen (2005, p. 6) points out, it is important in this debate to make a 
distinction between the formal economy, defined as “comprising regulated economic units and 
protected workers”, and the formal regulatory framework, defined as “comprising government 
policies, laws, and regulations”.  In the debate on the informal economy, three dominant schools 
of thought can be identified: the Dualist, Structuralist and Legalist, each of which offers its own 
unique explanation for how the informal, formal economy and formal regulatory framework are 
connected.  
 
The Dualist school makes a distinction between the formal and informal economy, of which the 
latter is comprised of marginal activities that provides a safety net for the poor. The sector is distinct 
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Figure 2.2 – Size of the informal sector in sub-Saharan Africa (ratio of GNI in 2003) 
Source: World Bank Doing Business database. This indicator measures output in the informal economy as a share of 
gross national product (%GNP, 1999/2000). Sourced from the study by Schneider (2002) 
 
from and not related to the formal sector. The Dualists argue that informal operators are excluded 
from the formal economy as a result of the imbalances between growth rates of the population 
and modern industrial employment, and a mismatch between people’s skills and modern economic 
opportunities (Chen, 2012, p. 4-5). They have little to say, however, about the relation to 
government regulations, instead focusing more on government provision of necessary support 
services (Chen, 2005).  
 
The Structuralists contest that the informal and formal economies are intrinsically linked, because 
informal enterprises and wages are subordinate to capitalist development. As a result of attempts 
to reduce labour costs and increase competitiveness, the reaction of formal firms to state regulation 
of the economy, global competition and the process of industrialization, drives people to work in 
informality (Chen, 2012, p. 5). In their view, it is the structure of the capitalist world economy, that 
explains the existence of the informal economy.  
 
Finally, the Legalists primarily focus on the relationship between people in the informal economy 
and the formal regulatory framework. They believe that government deregulation will lead to 
increased economic freedom and entrepreneurship among working people, especially in developing 
countries (from Chen 2005; de Soto, 1989). Because this thesis is focussed mainly on how the 
formal regulatory framework – the PNRO – is related to the informal economy, in this case, ASM 
in Côte d’Ivoire, this literature review proceeds by further discussing in more detail the theoretical 
underpinnings of the Legalist school of thought. This is important, because, as Hilson and 
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Maconachie (2017) explain, recent academic analysis has shed minimal light on why the ASM sector 
in sub-Saharan Africa is confined predominantly to an informal sector existence. Using the ideas 
of the Legalist school opens the door to broadening understanding of how the ASM formal 
regulatory framework contributes to the current status of the sector in sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
2.1.1 The ideas of Hernando de Soto 
 
De Soto (2000) declared that “The Legalist school sees the informal sector as comprised of 
“plucky” micro-entrepreneurs who choose to operate informally in order to avoid the costs, time 
and effort of formal registration and who need property rights to convert their assets into legally 
recognized assets”. Recognized as one of the most influential thinker on the subject of informality 
(Gilbert, 2002), De Soto argued that without property law, capital is impossible to create.  This is 
a dilemma facing a large part of the population of people in developing countries, who do not have 
legal property rights because they are often active in extra-legal parts of the economy (De Soto, 
2000, p. 15). By not extending rights to the extra-legal parts of the economy, De Soto argued, 
governments are denying the economic freedom to what amounts to the majority of the world’s 
population. Not only does failure to do so exclude the poor from participation in the world 
economy, but it seems to be an inexplicably move for a government, which stands to miss out on 
collecting enormous amounts of tax revenues (De Soto, 2000, p. 35).   
De Soto makes a distinction between possession and property, namely, a differentiation between 
physical and mental. One can be physically in possession of something, while property is an 
entitlement, created by law, which stays in force regardless of whether the owner is in physical 
possession or not. With possession enforcement depends on the possessor, while property is being 
maintained by law enforcement. Following this, it is the legal system that enables possession to 
become property or assets, and assets to become capital, which, according to De Soto, is the ability 
to represent assets in abstract value. While the poor do have assets – according to De Soto, it is a 
person’s physical property – they remain financially and commercially invisible, because they are 
not represented nor recorded in legal property rights. When people are not able to represent their 
assets, De Soto speaks of dead capital. A consequence of this is that people in the developing world 
are undercapitalised.  
 
A land title is one of the examples De Soto introduces as an asset that is often undercapitalised in 
development countries. The key to making use of dead capital is to generate surplus from these 
physical assets. Therefore, the key argument of De Soto’s logic is that to make use of the full 
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potential of an economy, dead capital needs to be transformed into living capital, making use of a 
coherent property rights system. ‘‘Money does not earn money. You need a property right before 
you can make money. Money presupposes property’’ (Siegel and Veiga, 2009 from De Soto, 2000, 
p. 64). The Legalists, therefore, promote one form of regulation, namely the formalization of 
property rights for the informal workforce to help them convert their informally-held assets into 
real assets (from Chen, 2005: De Soto, 2000). This is a crucial step toward alleviating millions of 
operators in the informal economy from hardship by enabling them to transfer their possessions 
into assets and let them participate in the formal economy. However, while the logic of De Soto 
seems very simple, it is not always clear what is understood by formalization. 
  
2.2 Formalization 
 
While the term appears to be very prominent in policy circles, Spiegel (2015) points out that the 
process and meaning of the concept is somewhat disputed and could mean different things in 
different contexts. Within academic circles, a distinction is often made between a narrow 
understanding and a broad understanding of formalization (Siwale & Siwale, 2017). The narrow 
understanding of formalisation is most closely aligned with the ideas of Hernando de Soto and is 
understood as an expansion of the legislative framework to include the extra-legal economy. This 
means that people operating in the informal economy need to obtain a license, register their 
accounts and pay taxes.  It assumes that even unaided formalisation can lead to economic growth 
and poverty reduction, because an expansion of the legal framework enables people to transfer 
their possession into assets (Benjamin, 2006). Because formalisation is treated as a product, rather 
than a process, implementation of the policy framework is often ad hoc.  
 
While De Soto’s understanding of formalisation has appeared to be extremely prominent in policy 
circles, with many governments around the world following his advice in their efforts to formalise 
the extra-legal economy, his argument has also been widely criticized by scholars for being overly 
simplistic (Gilbert, 2002). Scholars such as Heemskerk (2005) and Siegel and Veiga (2009) have 
criticized this understanding, explaining that one should adopt a broader understanding of 
formalisation, one that more refers to the process itself, rather than seeing formalisation as a 
product. Simply expanding the legislative framework in order to capture more state revenue is 
unlikely to address the livelihood demands and welfare issues of those active in the sector. Ribot 
and Peluso (2003) argue that it is important to make a distinction between “the right to benefits 
from things and the ability to derive benefits from things” (p.153). While within the Legalist school 
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the right and the ability are equated, the authors explain that a legal right does not necessarily 
translate into the ability to access this right. In other words, formalization should encompass both 
the costs as the benefits of entering the formal economy. For someone that operates in the informal 
economy, therefore, formalization should not only mean for obtaining a licence, registering 
accounts and paying taxes, but also a process which positions individuals to enjoy a host of benefits, 
such as legal ownership, tax breaks, membership in trade associations and social protection.  
 
Moreover, as has been explained, one of the key characteristics of the informal economy is its 
heterogeneity. This means that formalization has different meanings and implications for different 
operators in the informal economy. Consequently, in order to address the needs of an informal 
operator in the design of a policy framework, there must be a detailed understanding of who this 
operator is.  It is therefore essential for policymakers to recognize these different dimensions and 
become aware that formalisation is not a one-step process but rather an ongoing process. In order 
for formalization to be effective, the approach needs to be comprehensive but context specific in 
design and practice (Chen, 2012). This is the most important distinction between the narrow 
understanding of formalisation and the broader understandings of the concept and helps to explain 
why formalisation efforts of policymakers and donors can be very challenging. 
 
2.3 Formalization of ASM in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
In order to gain more control of sprawling activities and tackle the host of environmental and social 
impacts of the sector, governments in sub-Saharan Africa see formalisation as one of the key steps 
to a more effective regulation of the ASM sector (Hilson and Maconachie, 2017). The question is, 
however, under what conditions is the process likely to be effective?  The next section starts by 
explaining how the ASM formal regulatory framework came about in sub-Saharan Africa; and, how 
a limited understanding of the sector specific dimensions of the sector in the region may explain 
why formalizing its operations has been so unsuccessful. But how, exactly, is the formal regulatory 
framework for ASM connected to the often informal status of the sector in the region?  
 
Building on the ideas of De Soto, Hilson et al. (2017) present a theoretical framework that identifies 
the role of bureaucracy and costs and political drive as key factors for the successful formalization 
of the informal economy. While the framework can be used to explain why a formal regulatory 
framework is likely to be ineffective, the ideas of De Soto fail to explain the question whether a 
government is actually able to implement the adopted agenda. Therefore, the role of the capacity 
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of the government is added to the theoretical framework to explain why a formal regulatory is likely 
to be ineffective. Combined, these factors provide a theoretical framework to answer the main 
research question of this thesis.  
 
2.3.1 The ASM formal regulatory framework in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
For decades, ASM has been overlooked in economic policies and programs on both the 
international, regional and local level (Hilson and McQuilken, 2014). In sub-Saharan Africa, as a 
result, policy has been created that does not address the needs of those operating in the sector.  
The idea championed in policy circles has long been that the ASM sector is comprised of 
enterprising businessmen. This idea began to take shape after publication of the World Bank’s 
seminal report A Strategy for African Mining, 1992, which states that “there is no good reason to 
create differential access to mineral rights for different classes of mining investor’ and that ‘A state 
mining enterprise should compete on the same terms as a privately-owned company, foreign on 
the same terms as national, large companies under the same broad rules as small ones” (World 
Bank, 1992, p. 22). This means that ASM operators must compete on the same level and apply to 
the same policy frameworks as large-scale mining companies. Following the report’s prescriptions, 
the majority of the 36 countries in sub-Saharan Africa adopted policy frameworks and legislation 
to formalise ASM during the 1990s, building on these ungrounded cliams of the sector’s dynamics, 
thereby laying the foundation for an ASM economy that was deemed to remain informal (Fisher, 
2007). Additionally, with developing countries opening up their markets for foreign investors and 
large-scale mining companies, in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa mining legislation has been 
created that includes tax holidays and protracted titles for large-scale mining companies. 
Consequently, ASM has been put in a disadvantage (Hilson & Potter, 2005). As a result of the 
marginalization of ASM in mining sector reform, policy frameworks have been created that rather 
stifle the process of formalization and do the opposite of bringing people in the legal domain: they 
force people to mine illegally, often on the exploration and exploitation grounds of large mining 
companies (Banchirigah, 2006, Hilson & Potter, 2005). For example, in South Africa the expansion 
of ASM is strongly linked to how the sector is being treated within the policy framework, namely 
being regulated under the same legislation as large scale mining (Mutemeri and Petersen, 2002). In 
countries such as Guinea, Mali, Ghana and Tanzania ASM miners have been marginalized by the 
generous regulations – which are deemed necessary to attract large-scale mining companies – in 
terms of the length of leases and the conditions for their renewal (Campbell, 2003, Banchirigah, 
2006). This ‘large scale mining bias’ has resulted in the availability of very little land for ASM miners 
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to operate, because most land is made available by national governments to large-scale mining 
companies (Hilson, 2017). Even in the cases where land is made available for ASM miners to 
operate, the concessions grounds are often geologically unviable. For example, in Tanzania it is 
estimated that 70% of the land is allocated to large-scale mining companies (Oxfam, 2005).  
 
It was during the during the International Roundtable on Informal Mining, organized by the World Bank 
in 1995, that for the first time was recognized by a wide variety of experts, namely ASM holding a 
status of being largely poverty-driven. This means that many individuals active in the sector are 
working in ASM in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of their struggle to find any income generating 
activity in other sectors (Barry, 1996). Numerous scholars have supported this understanding in a 
wide variety of case-studies in sub-Saharan Africa, like Tanzania (Fisher, 2007), Sierra Leone 
(Maconachie and Binns, 2007; Maconachie, 2012), Liberia (Van Bockstael, 2014), the DR Congo 
(Geenen, 2013, 2014) and Ghana (Hilson and Garforth, 2013). While from 1995 onwards, the 
poverty-dimensions began to be present in donor rhetoric, the discussions failed on the longer turn 
to generate meaningful action and open up a space for ASM in the formal regulatory policy 
frameworks. Consequently, ASM projects and policies that do recognize the livelihood dimensions 
of the sector, have been launched outside of national and regional policy frameworks in sub-
Saharan Africa (Hilson & McQuilken, 2014). Hilson and Hilson (2015) explain that in in the context 
of ASM there seems to exist a “…disconnection between who policymakers and donors believe 
they are formalizing and regulating on the one hand, and the individuals – generally asset-less, cash-
strapped and desperate for some security of tenure – who seek permits on the other hand” (p. 14-
15). Given that many ASM operators are active in the sector because it is their only way to survive, 
they lack the means and financial capacity to join the formal economy. With mining legislation that 
prioritizes large-scale mining, ASM is deemed to stay and grow in the informal economy. By 
formulating ASM policy on the believe that the sector is comprised of enterprising businessmen, 
policymakers have designed and implemented policy frameworks that are ineffective and are 
stifling, rather than facilitating the formalization of ASM (Hilson & Hilson, 2015). The policy 
context of how the ASM formal regulatory framework came about helps to contextualize why the 
ASM sector is often marginalized in the formal regulatory framework in sub-Saharan Africa and 
underlines the importance of acknowledging the sector specific dimensions in the design and 
implementation of the policy framework in order to be effective. This is linked to the next two 
factors identified as playing a crucial role in the design and implementation of an effective ASM 
formalization strategy: the role of bureaucracy and costs and political drive. 
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2.3.2 Bureaucracy and Costs  
 
According to De Soto, governments can create informality through bureaucracy and costs. 
Individuals will continue to operate in informality if government procedures remain difficult and 
costly, because the incentives for individuals do not weigh the costs nor the effort to join the legal 
economy (Chen et al., 2004). De Soto’s argument was based on findings from his own research in 
Peru where it took up to 289 days to open a business in Lima, required spending US$ 1231 – 31 
times the monthly minimum wage, and took upwards of six years and eleven months and required 
207 administrative steps in 52 government offices to obtain the legal authorization to build a house 
on state-owned land (De Soto, 2002, p.18). Given that most operators in the ASM sector in sub-
Saharan Africa are poverty driven, it is unlikely that they are able to fulfil cumbersome bureaucratic 
procedures, travel long distances or pay high prices to obtain a licence. The marginalization of 
ASM in national policy frameworks which prioritize large-scale extraction in a country contributes 
to this dynamic. Bureaucracy and costs in this sense prevent people to join the formal economy. 
Numerous examples can be found in the literature that confirm this for ASM in sub-Saharan Africa, 
like in Ghana, where miners are not able to pay the fees for a licence and environmental permit 
and are obliged to travel to the capital to register (Hilson & Potter, 2005) or Zimbabwe, where 
consultancy costs of US$4000 and a registration fee of US$100 for an environmental impact 
assessment, impede miners to join the formal economy (Spiegel, 2015). In summary, “ineffective 
policies and bureaucratic inefficiency, a lot of paper-work, long waiting periods for obtaining 
licenses, long distances to travel, high costs for obtaining official document, including payment of 
bribes, limited availability of land on which artisanal miners can legally work, concern about ensuing 
high investment costs in a formal exploitation project [and] limited education of the miners, which 
renders bureaucratic and technical procedures not accessible to them (Geenen, 2012)” contribute 
to the persistence of ASM in the informal economy in countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
2.3.3 Political drive  
 
A second important factor that contributes to the informal status of ASM in sub-Saharan Africa is 
the political drive of policy makers to establish an effective ASM policy framework. Following De 
Soto, Siegel and Veiga (2009) explain that successful formalisation by a government is deemed to 
fail if a government lacks the will to implement the policy framework. For a government 
formalisation does of course cost money and effort to include the extra-legal economy in its existing 
legal framework and for a miner it means obedience to the law. However, De Soto explains that in 
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the end it is futile for a government to try to eradicate the extra-legal economy, given that such 
efforts are costly and create conflict that will most likely lead to the persistence of those being 
persecuted. Consequently, the only way for a government to prevent conflict and the persistence 
of the extra-legal economy, is by looking for a way to expand its property rights system to include 
this part of the economy (Siegel and Veiga, 2009). So without the full commitment of a 
government, successful formalisation is very unlikely, even when mining titling is prioritized 
(Hilson et al., 2017). De Soto used the example of the supposed terrorist threat to the Peruvian 
government during the 1980s as a way to illustrate the importance of political will in the 
formalization process.  
 
In his negotiations with the Peruvian Government, De Soto explained to the President of Peru 
that “if [the president] wanted Peruvians to avoid the temptations of the terrorists, he would have 
to show the people that working within the law was in their interest...due to bad law, the poor were 
facing huge entry and operational costs and were missing some of the crucial institutions needed 
to create prosperity (De Soto, 2002, p. xxii)”. Finally, this resulted in a systematic revision of the 
formalization process, which was based on an acknowledgement of the extra-legal economies 
dimensions and the installation of an ombudsman to connect with the population (Hilson et al., 
2017). Whilst in the case of ASM in sub-Saharan Africa, there is not a comparable case in terms of 
policy overhaul, there are different indications that support the idea that a shift in thinking towards 
ASM is gathering some momentum. Hilson et al. (2017) identify three reasons why there is 
currently an increased political drive. Firstly, the recognition that ASM is an integral part of the 
rural economy, forces policy makers to design a more comprehensive policy framework that does 
not treat each sector in policy individually. Secondly, more and more policy makers start to 
recognize the value of a well organized ASM sector, having the potential to alleviate millions of 
people from hardship and engage with volatile groups (Hilson and Osei, 20014). Thirdly and finally, 
based on formalization efforts like in Ghana or Tanzania, there is an increased recognition that the 
marginalization of ASM in the policy framework, as a result of large scale mining prioritization, 
does not lead to successful formalization. The question remains, whether this increased political 
drive is enough to create a real policy overhaul, as a result of the persistent idea of ASM being 
comprised of businessmen (Hilson et al., 2017). 
 
While De Soto underlines the importance of political drive of a government, his explanation is 
merely focussed on the economic and livelihood dimensions of ASM expansion. However, his 
ideas do not tell us anything about why policy makers would lack the political drive to formalize 
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the ASM sector. What if a government does not want to eradicate the extra-legal economy, nor want 
to formalize the sector? Or what if the existing power structures simply benefit from maintaining 
the status quo? Having a closer look at authors like Chabal and Daloz (1999) and Reno (2009) does 
provide interesting insights in how government officials can maximize their power and income by 
making use of the informal character of African polities. Often, high-ranking politicians and 
businessmen manage to exercise their political authority through the private control of 
environmental resources in sub-Saharan Africa, having therefore little incentive to formalize a 
sector they are directly or indirectly benefitting from (Reno, 1995, 1998).  
 
With ‘the political instrumentalization of disorder’, Chabal and Daloz (1999) refer to a “process by 
which political actors in Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty 
and sometimes even chaos, which characterizes most African polities.” (p.xviii). While De Soto 
deems an absence of political will by a government as economically irrational because of the missed 
tax revenues, Chabal and Daloz (1999) explain that one could see this as rational, once we 
understand the ways in which individuals seek to instrumentalize resources which they command 
within this general political economy of disorder. In this sense, lacking the political drive to 
formalize can be deemed rational for those who benefit from disorder. Rather than seeing 
informality as a lack of state capacity, it should be seen as a condition which offers opportunities 
for those who know how to play that system. Classic examples from the ‘conflict minerals’ literature 
support this understanding, like the case of eastern DRC (e.g. Eichstaedt, 2011; Vlassenroot and 
Raeymakers, 2004) and Sierra Leone (e.g. Hazen, 2013; Le Billon, 2008; Smillie et al., 2000).  
 
2.3.4 Capacity 
 
Finally, a factor that according to the political economy and development economics literature does 
appear to influence the effectiveness of any formal regulatory framework, but is not taken into 
account by De Soto’s argument is the question whether a government is actually able to enforce 
the adopted legislation. Interestingly enough, while the role of state capacity for economic 
development has been widely discussed in the literature (Johnson and Koyama, 2017), this is rarely 
considered to be a relevant factor determining the level of informality of ASM operations (Van 
Bockstael, 2014). Therefore, questioning the ability of a state to collect taxes, enforce law and order 
and provide public goods needs to be taken into account as an important factor that determines 
the success of any formalization attempt. Because even in the case when the sector specific 
dynamics of ASM are acknowledged in the policy framework, when there is a high political drive 
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to formalize and when bureaucracy and costs are limited, successful formalization is unlikely if a 
government simply lacks the ability to implement such agenda.   
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
While the informal economy comprises two-third of the world’s labour force, a lot of 
misunderstanding of the sectors different dimensions and characteristics exists. Three dominant 
schools of thought can be identified that explain how the informal economy, the formal regulatory 
framework and the informal economy are connected. Because this thesis is mainly focussed on the 
connection between the formal regulatory framework and the informal economy, the ideas of 
Hernando De Soto, a legalist, are most suitable to help to understand the process of formalizing 
ASM in Côte d’Ivoire. According to his logic, an expansion of the legal regulatory framework is 
necessary, to convert the informally-held assets of the poor into real assets. In other words, it is 
necessary to formalize the extra-legal economy. While this understanding of formalization appears 
to be very prominent in policy circles in sub-Saharan Africa, others explain that this understanding 
is too narrow in its assumption that formalization is a product and not a process. Therefore, a 
formalization process that fits narrow understanding of the concept is deemed to fail. In order for 
formalization to be effective, the design of the policy framework has to be based on an 
acknowledgement of ASM’s specific dimensions and characteristics. Multiple cases in sub-Saharan 
Africa show that governments in the region often adopt a too narrow understanding of 
formalization. Because it was long understood that the ASM was comprised of enterprising 
businessmen, a policy framework was designed that equalled the ASM sector to the large scale 
mining sector. Together with a large scale mining bias in the policy framework, this has led to a 
marginalization of the ASM sector in sub-Saharan Africa. De Soto’s ideas help to explain that both 
bureaucracy and costs and a lack of political drive rather contribute to the persistence of ASM in 
the informal sector, than that they help individuals to escape the ASM poverty trap in sub-Saharan 
Africa. However, his argument lacks the ability to explain the role of a government’s capacity to 
implement such legislation. Using these insights provides the necessary scope to research the 
formalization process of ASM in Côte d’Ivoire. The research design, together with the 
methodology, will be presented in the next chapter. 
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 36 
Chapter 3 – Research Design and methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In order to answer the main research question, “What approach has been taken to formalise ASM 
in Côte d’Ivoire, and why is this approach (in)effective?”, the thesis follows different analytical 
steps. The specific purpose of the analysis is twofold: firstly, to improve understanding of the 
formalisation process of ASM in Côte d’Ivoire and secondly, to improve understanding of how a 
formal regulatory framework is connected to the informal economy. In order to address these 
objectives, a theoretical framework has been constructed using insights from the development 
economics, political economy and legal literature in the previous chapter. The main analysis will 
follow the ideas of Hernando De Soto to explain how the formal regulatory framework for ASM 
in Côte d’Ivoire – the PNRO – is connected to the informal economy – the artisanal and small-
scale gold mining sector in the country. This approach will be used to explain why the current 
formalization approach in the country is ineffective. Core in this analysis are the concepts: the 
formal regulatory framework, the (in)formal ASM sector in sub-Saharan Africa, formalization, 
bureaucracy and costs, political drive and capacity. A qualitative case-study of the formal regulatory 
ASM framework in the Côte d’Ivoire is selected as the most appropriate research method. Desk 
research, three months of field research and an internship in Côte d’Ivoire have provided the 
necessary tools to obtain the data. 
 
3.2 Research design 
Given that very little information is available about the case of ASM in Côte d’Ivoire in the 
literature the first part of the analysis is focussed on getting an overview of the significance of ASM 
in the country. The analysis will focus on the size and the positive and negative social and 
environmental impacts of the sector. The analysis will be based on public information available in 
the country, policy reports and local experiences from ASM communities. This should provide a 
general understanding of the significance of the sector and the importance of the need for an 
effective formal regulatory ASM framework.  
 
Once the significance of the ASM sector is understood, the formal regulatory framework for ASM 
will be introduced. The analysis will focus on what approach has been taken to formalize ASM in 
the country and explain why this approach is ineffective. The analysis is build on the direct results 
of the PNRO and a multi-stakeholder experience around the design and implementation of the 
PNRO. The experiences of the different stakeholders in the field are used to provide an 
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encompassing image of what kind of formalization strategy has been adopted. While the 
experiences of the government might provide insights in the direct results of the program, 
experiences by the private sector and the ASM communities might provide more critical insights 
in how the formal regulatory framework was implemented and whether the program actually 
addresses the problems it was designed for. Once this is understood, it can be explained why the 
formalization process is ineffective. The concepts of the narrow understanding of formalization 
and the role of bureaucracy and costs will be used as a tool to explain why the government’s 
approach is ineffective. A narrow understanding of formalization is characterized by a 
formalization process that is ad-hoc implemented, primarily focussed on the expansion of the formal 
regulatory framework and does not address the livelihood demands of those participating in the 
informal economy. A formalization process that fits the narrow understanding of formalization is 
likely to be ineffective. Secondly, as De Soto explains, difficult bureaucratic procedures and high 
costs prevent ASM operators from obtaining an authorisation. This provides a second explanations 
of why the formal regulatory framework is ineffective.  
 
While this part of the analysis enables to explain what approach has been taken to formalise ASM 
in Côte d’Ivoire, it does not explain why government of Côte d’Ivoire has been unable to 
implement an effective ASM formalization strategy. This is an important question, because one 
would expect the country to have learned from experiences in the region, that have a long history 
of mining sector reform. As has been explained in the literature review, De Soto identifies the role 
of political drive as a crucial factor for the success of any formalization process. Two factors are 
identified that could explain an absence of political drive. Firstly, the role of political figures 
privately benefitting from the informal status of ASM could explain why they would not want to 
formalize the sector. Secondly, the prioritization of large-scale mining in the country could explain 
why there is little focus on the ASM sector and provides a second explanation of why there is little 
political drive to formalize the sector. The analysis is based on the experiences of different 
stakeholders in the field and reports by international experts. Finally, while the lack of political 
drive can explain why a formal regulatory framework was adopted that was ineffective, a second 
factor must be taken into account that is not explained by the argument of De Soto. Because even 
in the case of a high political drive, it could also be the case that the government was simply not 
able to implement the formalization agenda. Therefore, the role of capacity is used as a second 
factor to explain why an ineffective formal regulatory framework was adopted. The argument is 
build on the direct results of the PNRO and the experiences of different stakeholders in the field.  
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These different analytical steps provide an encompassing overview of what approach has been 
taken in Côte d’Ivoire to formalize the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector and enable to 
explain why the current approach of the government of Côte d’Ivoire is ineffective.  
 
3.3 Methodology  
 
The main analysis of this thesis is built on the direct results of the PNRO and a multi-stakeholder 
experiences of the formalization process of artisanal and small-scale gold mining in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Because experiences are highly subjective concepts within the context specific reality of the case of 
Côte d’Ivoire, a qualitative case-study of the formal regulatory ASM framework in the country has 
been selected as the most appropriate research method. Following the constructivist tradition of 
qualitative research, “to display [the] multiple constructed realities through the shared investigation of meanings 
and explanations (Ritchie et al., 2013, p.12)” a wide variety of perspectives of multiple stakeholders 
in the field has been gathered through semi-structured interviews. The interviews were aimed at 
surveying the opinions of the identified stakeholders on the effectiveness of the formal regulatory 
framework for the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector. This includes perspectives from 
both international, regional, national and local stakeholders in the field, ranging from international 
donors to informal gold miners. Given the often marginalized position of ASM communities in 
sub-Saharan Africa, specific emphasis was put on including their experiences in the analysis. This 
enables to reflect on the complex process of formalization within the specific context of ASM in 
Côte d’Ivoire. Data have been obtained through desk research and three months’ field research in 
Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
Desk research was done before and during the field research in Côte d’Ivoire through the collection 
of secondary data like newspaper publications, radio broadcasts, articles by think tank 
organizations, Facebook posts and policy reports. These sources provided the necessary data 
around the direct results of the PNRO. Field research in Côte d’Ivoire mainly consisted of semi-
structured interviews with individuals and focus groups. After a stakeholder mapping, interviews 
have been conducted with government authorities (national and local), national regulating agencies 
for the mining industry, civil society organizations, donor organizations and intergovernmental 
agencies. Interviews conducted with these stakeholders were mainly semi-structured. Within the 
ASM communities, semi-structured interviews have been conducted with miners, diggers, 
financers, land owners, farmers, local authorities and journalists. These interviews provided the 
data needed to present a multi-stakeholder experience on the effectiveness of the design and 
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implementation of the PNRO.  
 
Different methodological challenges were faced. The different characteristics of ASM make 
research in this field particularly challenging. Firstly, the fluctuating production levels, seasonality 
and informality of the sector present severe challenges to get an accurate overview of the size and 
revenue streams of the sector. Secondly, because of the often illegal status of the activity in a 
country, both the accessibility to ASM sites as well as the reluctance of stakeholders to discuss the 
topic, presents a severe challenge to obtain data. As a result of its informal character, ASM activity 
is often found in remote and inaccessible areas of a country, where state control is limited and 
where armed forces, like soldiers, police officers or (former-)rebels maintain a foothold in the 
control of natural resources (Verbrugge and Adam, 2016). Therefore, when visiting mining sites 
and collecting data security issues can present serious challenges (Heemskerk, 2005). Any research 
in the field of ASM, should take these challenges in considerations and adapt its research strategy 
to these challenges. 
 
To overcome these challenges, a three months’ internship at ‘Social Justice’1, a local NGO, has 
been used as a methodological tool to gain access to the data. By representing a local NGO, rather 
than presenting myself as a foreign researcher, an increased level of trust enabled to meet 
government officials and visit ASM mining sites in a relatively short period. While this increased 
access, one has to be aware of how this might have limited the position as being independent as a 
researcher. Data have been gathered in Côte d’Ivoire over a period of three months from January 
2017 to April 2017. The specific time of the year was taken in consideration when researching ASM 
because of the inaccessibility of mining sites during the rainy season (April-October). Finally, while 
language barriers were expected, these were not often experienced as a result of the level of French 
speaking miners. In the single case where miners only spoke a local or foreign languages, local 
guides helped as translators.  
 
The first phase of the research was primarily concerned with interning at ‘Social justice’. This 
enabled to do a stakeholder mapping and get the right contacts to arrange access to ASM mining 
sites. The second phase was headlined by involvement in the ASM West Africa Workshop,2 1-3 
March 2017 in Abidjan. The international conference was organized to “increase awareness of a 
sector that is still largely unknown, discuss shared challenges and identify best practices, so that 
                                                   
1 http://www.socialjustice-ci.net/ 
2 https://www.asmwestafrica.org/  
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ASM management and development policies can be strengthened and improved” (ASM West 
Africa Report, 2017). Being a part of the organization and attending the series of presentation by 
a multitude of (inter)national ASM stakeholders at the conference, enabled to research the national 
perspective towards formalization as well as the regional perspectives towards formalization. 
Finally, being part of the organization, enabled to get more insights in the different agendas of 
those participating at the conference. The third phase of research consisted of three field trips to 
different ASM mining sites in the country. Access was arranged through the local contacts and 
networks of the internship and contact with a mining company. The first fieldtrip was to the region 
of Bouafle and Angovia, located in the centre of the country, and took place between 7-10 March. 
The second fieldtrip was to the region of Hire, located between Abidjan and Yamoussoukro, and 
took place between 19-22 March. The third fieldtrip was scheduled to the region of Ity, near the 
border with Liberia, between 19-23 March, but was last-minute cancelled, because of security 
concerns. The three fieldtrip locations are presented in ANNEX I.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Using the theoretical framework, the necessary analytical steps are identified to gain more 
understanding in the formalization process of ASM in Côte d’Ivoire. In the next chapter, the 
significance of the ASM sector in the country will be analysed as well as the effectiveness of the 
PNRO, using the concepts of the narrow understanding of formalization and bureaucracy and 
costs. Chapter 5 will explain why an ineffective formal regulatory framework was adopted using 
the role of political drive and capacity. These two chapters together provide an answer to the main 
research question of this thesis.  
  
Chapter 4
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H4 – Formalizing Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, experiences around the formalization of artisanal and small-scale gold mining in 
Côte d’Ivoire will be shared. The first part of the chapter elaborates on the recent growth of the 
sector and its impacts on the country. These developments initiated the need for the adoption of 
a formal regulatory framework for the effective management of the ASM sector by the Ministry of 
Industries and Mines (MIM) in Côte d’Ivoire: the “Programme National de Rationalisation de l’Orpaillage 
(PNRO)”. The chapter continues with outlining what kind of formalization strategy has been 
adopted by the MIM and whether this has been an effective strategy. The last part of the chapter 
continues with answering the question, why the formal regulatory framework for ASM in Côte 
d’Ivoire is ineffective, making use of the concepts of the narrow understanding of formalization 
and bureaucracy and costs.  
 
4.2 ASM in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Because very little information is available in the literature about the significance of ASM in Côte 
d’Ivoire, the first part of this chapter is focussed on outlining the size and positive and negative 
impacts of the sector. This is important, because this enables to explain why there is a need for an 
effective formal regulatory ASM framework in the country. In the last 15 years Côte d’Ivoire has 
been through a turbulent period, to say the least, with the country experiencing a coup d’etat in 1999 
and two civil wars in respectively 2002 and 2011. After the end of the second civil war the political 
and security situation in Côte d’Ivoire gradually normalized, resulting in robust average annual 
GDP growth rates of 8,5% between 2012 and 2015. “[In order] to lay the foundations of strong 
and inclusive growth allowing Côte d’Ivoire to ascend to emerging country status by 2020”, 
president Ouattara of Côte d’Ivoire presented the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2011, 
focussing on four pillars that were most important for the countries development (ADB, 2013). 
Part of the NDP was the ambition to make more use of the untapped and underexploited mineral 
resource potential of the country by trying to attract numerous mining companies interested in the 
manganese, iron ore, nickel, bauxite and, crucially, gold. In a series of investor-friendly policies, the 
government has attracted several mining companies like the British Randgold Resources and the 
Australian Endeavour Mining and Newcrest Mining. While the ambition was to triple gold 
production in the next four to six years (The Economist, 2013), production levels have almost 
doubled between 2011 and 2015 (see Figure 4.1). Next to large scale mining the country hosts a 
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dozen semi-industrial companies, although they seem not to be in operation (EPRM, 2016). The 
main minerals mined on a small and artisanal scale in Côte d’Ivoire are diamonds and gold. The 
ASM diamond sector in Côte d’Ivoire gained international attention after the successful 
implementation of The Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development (PRADD) program, 
which played a key role in the lift of the UN embargo on the diamond sector in the country, after 
ten years of non-compliance (USAID, 2014).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MIM (2016) 
 
While artisanal and small-scale gold mining has a long history in the country3, the MIM in Côte 
d’Ivoire indicates that the sector has experienced a record growth over the 1999-2011 period as a 
result of the absence of a mining administration in some parts of the country during the political 
turmoil and a record gold price, which reached up to 56 USD a gram in 2011 against 8.75 USD a 
few years earlier (MIM, 2017). ASM communities from the regions of Hire and Angovia confirm 
to have experienced a similar growth of the activity during that timeframe4. Data about the size 
and revenue streams of the ASM gold sector remain wild estimations, given that a national census 
has never been conducted in Côte d’Ivoire. Official estimates place the number around 500.000 
operators who directly and indirectly depend on the sector, many of whom come from 
neighbouring countries like Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso and Ghana (PAC, 2017). According to the 
United Nations Group of Experts for the Côte d’Ivoire (GoECDI) (2015), production levels for some 
ASM mining sites are comparable with large scale mining operations in the country. The production 
                                                   
3 Interviews with local authorities Angovia (09/03/2017) and Hire (22/03/2017) and ASM expert Côte d’Ivoire 
(09/02/17) 
4 Interviews with ASM communities in Hire (21/03/2017) and Angovia (09/03/2017) 
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of Gamina, a former ASM gold mine near Daloa (see Map of Côte d’Ivoire), would account for 
13.8 percent of the country’s official annual production of 18,6 tons in 2014. This would translate 
into a lost revenue around three million USD in lost royalties and other lost revenue in terms of 
export and windfall taxes (GoECDI, 2015). A total estimation of lost revenues by the government 
would account for US$958 million over the period 2005-2015 according to the MIM (AA, 2016). 
According to the MIM, the activity can be found in 24 out of the 31 regions in the country, with 
the highest intensity ranging from the south-west of the country to the north (see Figure 4.2, MIM, 
2017). 
Figure 4.2: Level of activity of artisanal and small-scale gold mining in Côte d’Ivoire 
Source MIM (2017) 
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Next to lost revenues by the national government, the GoECDI makes note of land tenure tensions 
with autochthone communities, widespread use of mercury, cyanide and other chemicals in gold 
amalgamation processes, (child) prostitution, land degradation, deforestation, landslides, which 
have caused several deadly accidents, child labour and the financing of former rebels (GoECDI, 
2015,2016). Numerous mining companies have indicated to have conflicts with artisanal gold 
miners illegally mining on their exploration and exploitation ground, causing serious security risks 
for both the artisanal miners and large scale mining operations as well as a loss of production.5 A 
recent report by Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) has mapped the illicit trade of gold between 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso, explaining that the extremely porous borders between the 
countries allow for a high degree of labour mobility and smuggling, posing a significant loss to 
public revenue, undermining government oversight and, if left unchecked, having the potential to 
destabilize the region (PAC, 2017).  
 
When asked about the impacts of the activity on the local communities, ASM operators and 
villagers in the regions of Angovia and Hire indicated that the activity has contributed a lot to the 
economic development of these rural towns. The increased ASM activity in their region has created 
both direct job opportunities, like for example mining, digging and washing, but has also indirectly 
contributed to jobs like the production of construction materials and electricity networks6. Also 
improved transport possibilities and the construction of more houses are indicated as positive 
impacts. One villager in Hire explains that “while I am not a miner, I profit from the presence of 
motor taxi’s in the village, that are mainly used by the [artisanal] miners”7. Both the population and 
local commerce have strongly increased. A local journalist in Hire estimates the population to have 
grown from 35.000 to 60.000 inhabitants between 2007 and 2015. However, the sudden boom of 
the activity has also increased the prices of housing and commercial products and the level of 
criminality. This sudden increase of the activity has created tensions between the often foreign 
ASM operators and the local population, because not everybody is able to profit from the activity 
in the same degree. Another villager indicates that the often ‘fast money’ is especially attractive to 
the local youth, resulting in increased school drop-out and tensions in local marriages.8 
 
                                                   
5 Interviews with mining company employees (21/02/2017; 15/03/2017) and consultant (21/02/17) 
6 Interviews with ASM communities in Angovia and Hire (09/03/2017; 22/03/2017)  
7 Interview with villager in Hire (21/03/2017) 
8 Interviews with local authorities Angovia (09/03/2017) and Hire (22/03/2017), teacher and youth worker Angovia 
(08/03/2017), journalists and youth worker Hire (20/03/2017) 
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In summary, artisanal and small-scale gold mining can be found in almost all regions of Côte 
d’Ivoire. The activity has experienced a strong growth over the 1999-2011 period as a result of the 
political instability in the country and a high international gold price. Because the sector contributes 
significantly to gold production, it is expected that the government has lost large amounts of 
revenue, due to the informal status of the sector and regional smuggling. The sector contributes 
both to negative social and environmental impacts, like child labour and mercury pollution, as well 
as positive impacts like job creation, the stimulation of local commerce and gold production.   
 
4.3 The formal regulatory framework: The PNRO 
 
The formal regulatory framework that applies for artisanal and small-scale gold mining in Côte 
d’Ivoire is the Mining Code of 2014. According to the law n°2014-138 of the Mining Code of 2014, 
“all mineral substances [...] in the ground and underground [...] are the property of the State of Côte d’Ivoire” 
(article 2) (Code Minier, 2014). This means that all natural resources in the ground and underground 
in Côte d’Ivoire are property of the State. Next to the distinction between surface and subsurface 
rights, the Mining Code explains that “any individual or entity [...] may undertake any activity regulated 
under [the Mining Code] on the Ivoirian territory provided they have previously obtained a mineral right or 
authorisation (article 4)” (Code Minier, 2014). This means that any ASM operator in Côte d’Ivoire 
that is active without having obtained an authorisation of the State is according to the Mining Code 
of 2014 an illegal operator. ASM activities may solely be undertaken by nationals of Côte d’Ivoire 
and in zones reserved by the government for the specific purpose of ASM activity (articles 52 and 
64) (Code Minier, 2014). An overview of the ASM legal framework in Côte d’Ivoire is provided in 
Table 4.1.  
 
In a response to “the expansion of the illegal activity, with negative consequences for both the 
population and the environment” the government presented in 2013 the “Plan National de 
Rationalisation de l’Orpaillage (PNRO) in order to “clean up, organize and regulate the sector, so 
that it is in the short term a formal legal activity” (MIM, 2013). The program was conceived of and 
designed by the MIM (EPRM, 2016). The government’s objective was to gradually bring informal 
ASM operators to the formal domain through training, organizing the sector in groups and to learn 
ASM operators about new farming techniques, that preserve flora and fauna.  
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Table 4.1: ASM legal framework Côte d’Ivoire 
 Artisanal mining authorisation 
Issuance By ministerial order, to individuals of Ivorian nationality or Ivoirian majority 
cooperatives (article 65) 
Rights •! Exclusive mining rights, expect in case of discover of a deposit requiring semi-
industrial or industrial methods and processes to min, in which the holder is 
indemnified (article 66 and 71) 
•! No chemicals or explosives (article 68) 
•! No workings on agricultural lands without settlement (article 70) 
Terms •! 2 years, renewable (article 67) 
•! 25 hectares maximum (article 69) 
•! Non-transferable (article 72) 
Source: Code Minier (2014) 
 
The program was launched in October 2013 and consisted of five main phases (ASM West Africa 
Report, 2017): 
 
1)! A preparatory phase during which Government officials were trained and local population 
were informed about the illicit character of the mining activities occurring on their lands; 
2)! An information-gathering phase during which GPS coordinates and ancillary data were 
collected concerning illegal sites and operations, in order to assess the scale of the issue; 
3)! A third phase in which illicit mining sites were forcibly closed by security forces; 
4)! A phase focusing on the improvement of mining techniques, to be orchestrated by the 
State-owned mining company SODEMI  
5)! A final phase when environmental impacts are to be mitigated by rehabilitating former 
illegal ASM sites and by educating local communities. 
 
At the time of writing, only the three first phases of the program have been implemented. 
According to MIM 429 illicit gold mines have been identified and forcefully closed down, 68 local 
technical committees have been installed, hundreds of miners have been arrested and substantive 
amounts of weapons, ammunition, mining equipment, chemicals and narcotics have been seized. 
Despite these efforts, 185 illegal gold-mining sites were counted, including 142 former recolonized 
sites and 47 new sites (MIM, 2017). Miners either continue their activity at night or return to the 
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mining sites as soon as the government’s security forces have left their region9. According to the 
ASM communities in the region of Hire and Angovia, the PNRO is not an effective policy. “The 
government arrives with a lot of force, closes down mining sites and stays for two weeks. The 
moment they leave, miners simply return. The problem is that there is no follow-up.”10  According 
to multiple interviews with different large-scale mining companies in Côte d’Ivoire, the main 
problem they face is that the conflicts between ASM and LSM continue after the implementation 
of the PNRO. During the PNRO the government has helped them to forcefully remove miners of 
their terrain and close down mining sites, but this has not solved the problem. One employee 
explained:  
 
…Our main concern is not a loss of production due to ASM activity, but a concern about 
security. We have a big problem when an accident happens with an illegal miner working 
on our terrain, primarily in terms of reputation. We can ask the government to remove 
miners from our terrain, but on the long run this does not change the situation. The current 
policy does not address these problems, while it is the governments responsibility11.  
 
These results present an image of a policy framework, that was designed first and foremost as an 
immediate response to the emerging problems that arose as a result of the ASM sectors strong 
growth over the 1999-2011 period. To address the negative environmental and social impacts, the 
MIM designed a policy framework that was particularly focussed on the identification of illegal 
gold mining sites and subsequently the forceful evection of these sites. While the program has 
successfully identified hundreds of illegal artisanal small scale mining sites, the MIM has not been 
able to implement all phases of the program. ASM activity continues in the country, with the ASM 
miners simply returning to mining sites or working at night. In a response to the “persistence of 
the illicit activity and in order to prevent disastrous consequences for the environment and 
population” the MIM has among other things formulated the ambition to “implement more large-
scale security operations” (MIM, 2017b). The question is, will this bring any change to the current 
state of the sector? Most likely, ASM activity continues and ASM operators, that already face 
extremely difficult working conditions, become even more marginalized. This raises the question, 
why has the current formalization approach been so ineffective? 
 
                                                   
9 Reports GoECDI (2015, 2016), interviews with mining company employee (22/03/2017) and ASM communities 
in Angovia and Hire (09/03/2017; 22/03/2017)  
10 Interview with youth worker Angovia (08/03/2017) 
11 Interview with Grace 
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4.4 A narrow understanding of formalisation 
 
First and foremost, the formalisation approach adopted by the MIM seems to align with what in 
the literature review has been described as a narrow understanding of formalization, reflecting the 
ideas of the Legalist school of thought in the policy framework. As will be explained, the design and 
implementation of the formal regulatory framework was characterized by an ad-hoc implementation, 
was primarily focussed on the legal framework and was not a comprehensive approach that was 
context specific in design and practice.  
 
4.4.1 Ad-hoc implementation 
 
Firstly, experiences from ASM communities indicate that the implementation of PNRO was ad-
hoc. According to a villager in Angovia, they were simply being informed that in a period of three 
months all mining sites would be closed down. A miner in the same region explained that:  
 
…the government should really have taken more time for the local population to adapt to 
the new situation. There has been no transition period during which the government tried 
to help us to apply for an authorisation or become legally active.12  
 
A consequence of ad-hoc implementation is that ASM operators, that already face hard working 
conditions, lose their jobs until the moment an authorisation has been granted to them. For people 
who work in the sector, because it is their only means of survival, this leaves them no other choice 
than to continue to operating informally.  
 
4.4.2 Primarily focussed on the legal framework 
 
Secondly, the formalization approach by the government of Côte d’Ivoire is very narrow its focus 
on the legal framework. This is illustrated by the mere focus of the PNRO on coming to grips with 
“the expansion of the illegal activity”. While the identification and closing down of illegal gold 
mining sites is part of a successful formalization strategy, this certainly does not encompass the 
total picture of what formalization in the context of ASM entails. One miner in the region of Hire 
explained that: 
 
                                                   
12 Interview with ASM operators in Hire (22/03/2017) 
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…the current policy is not effective, because it does not enable people to become legally 
active. The government should explain to the people, what steps we specifically need to 
take to work in legality.13  
 
According to a local NGO in Abidjan, the understanding of the Mining Code remains also very 
limited in the country, especially in remote areas. For example, for the exploitation of minerals, 
people in remote areas of the country are not always familiar with the fact that the extraction of 
natural resources is an illegal activity without the permission of the State, while this might be a very 
clear distinction for a large scale mining company. This illustrates that formalization is more than 
just a product. While the formal regulatory framework of the government has been primarily 
focussed on dealing with the negative expressions of the ASM sector and has changed the miners 
right to benefit from things, miners have not been able to benefit from those rights. Currently, ASM 
operators only experience the costs of entering the informal economy. In the design and 
implementation of the formal regulatory framework, very little attention has been paid to let 
informal ASM operators benefit from entering the formal economy, like legal ownership, social 
protection or getting organized. During the ASM West Africa Workshop a government official, 
rightly pointed out that formalisation is more than a legal framework:  
 
…Before legalisation occurs, people need to be organised and formalise their mining 
operations. In this regard, formalisation is about setting up the necessary organisational 
structures, in order to support legalisation of mining (ASM West Africa Report, 2017).  
 
Given that the PNRO is still in the third stage of the implementation, the government has failed 
to meet these preconditions. Therefore, to successfully enforce the formalization policies, the 
government needs to start organizing ASM operators, like miners, diggers, financiers, buyers and 
exporters, along the value chain.  
 
4.4.3 Formalization does not address livelihood needs 
Thirdly, the current approach does not address the livelihood demands of those active in the sector, 
nor is the approach comprehensive and context specific in design and practice. When asked what 
the government could have done better, ASM communities in the region of Hire and Angovia 
explain that the government should have done a better job in consulting the local communities on 
what problems really arise. Both in Hire and Angovia, the ASM communities indicate that they 
                                                   
13 13 Interview with ASM operators in Angovia (09/03/2017) 
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have the feeling that the government does not understand how the ASM activity contributes to 
economic development, local problems and development issues.14 For example, an ASM operator 
that has been granted an authorisation is only aloud to work in zones reserved by the government 
for the specific purpose of ASM activity. However, according to the reports by the European 
Partnership for Responsible Minerals (EPRM, 2016) and the GoECDI (2015, 2016), the 
government has not yet clearly defined, unoccupied and geologically viable parcels for miners. This 
means that miners have no other choice than to return to the mining sites that have been closed 
down by the government. Rather than helping ASM operators to become part of the formal 
economy, the current approach makes life for informal ASM communities even more difficult. 
This clearly does not contribute to a successful formalization of the artisanal and small-scale gold 
mining sector in the country. 
 
4.5 Bureaucracy and Costs 
 
According to De Soto, individuals will continue to operate informally if government procedures 
remain difficult and costly, because the incentives for individuals do not weigh the costs nor the 
efforts to join the legal economy. As formulated in the Mining Code of 2014, ASM operators in 
Côte d’Ivoire are only aloud to work legally if they are in the position of an authorisation that has 
to be granted by the MIM. While according to the MIM currently 40 authorisations for ASM have 
been delivered, no information about where these miners operate could be confirmed by the 
researcher. A list of of these authorisations could upon request by the MIM not be provided15, nor 
were any ASM operators with authorisations identified during the fieldtrips. Most recent public 
data from the MIM’s website, states that only ASM authorisations have been provided to ASM 
diamond miners (MIM, 2016b) and 14 licences have been issued to export, but not to mine gold 
(EPRM, 2016). Based on this information, it can be concluded that no or very limited 
authorisations have been handed out over the PNRO-timeframe and no or very limited legal 
artisanal and small-scale gold mining takes places in Côte d’Ivoire. Numerous miners explain that 
they have filed a demand for an authorisation, but none of them have heard back from the MIM. 
Some of these cases have been waiting for months. “There are many miners that would like to 
work in legality, but they simply do not have the means”16. This information is supported by the 
report from the EPRM (2016) stating that “application for an ASM permit is reportedly arduous, 
costly, and there are reports of applications submitted six or more months ago, and with no 
                                                   
14 Interviews with ASM communities in Angovia and Hire (09/03/2017; 22/03/2017)  
15 Interview with General Director of the MIM (24/03/2017) 
16 Interview with youth worker Angovia (09/03/17) 
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response from the MIM”. Because the government is currently in the process of starting to hand 
out authorisations, it is too early to state that the current process to obtain an authorisation is too 
bureaucratic and costly. Moreover, the researcher has been unable to find any detailed information 
on which steps a miner needs to take to obtain licence. However, the fact that over a period of 
more than three years the government has handed out no (or a very limited amount of) 
authorisations and the absence of any easily available information about how an ASM operators 
could obtain a licence, do support the idea that the process is cumbersome. As a government 
official explained during the ASM West Africa Workshop: “The perception alone of a complex 
regulatory framework and high cost of compliance, can prevent operators from working legally” 
(ASM West Africa Report, 2017). These findings support the understanding that currently the 
incentives for miners to join the legal economy, do not weigh the costs. This leaves ASM operators 
with no choice than to continue operating informally. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In a response to the strong growth and negative social and environmental impacts of the artisanal 
and small-scale gold mining sector in Côte d’Ivoire, the government formulated a formal regulatory 
framework to “clean up, organize and regulate the sector, so that it is in the short term a formal 
legal activity”. While it was the MIM’s ambition to gradually bring ASM operators in the formal 
domain, not much has changed since the adoption of the PNRO: no (or very limited) authorisations 
have been handed out, no geologically viable ASM corridors have been identified and the negative 
impacts of the ASM sector, including LSM-ASM conflicts, have not decreased. To refer to the 
governments ambition, the sector has been ‘cleaned up’, but not ‘organized and regulated’. The 
ineffectiveness of the formal regulatory framework can be explained by two factors. Firstly, the 
MIM has taken a formalization approach that is too narrow in its focus. The ad-hoc implementation, 
the primary focus on the legal side of formalisation and the adoption of a policy framework that 
does not address the livelihood demands of ASM operators, has resulted in a situation where the 
benefits for ASM operators to enter to formal domain, do not weigh the costs. Secondly, the 
bureaucracy and costs to obtain an authorisation prevent miners from entering the formal domain. 
This has lead to a situation where currently no legal artisanal and small-scale gold mining takes 
places in Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
During the ASM West Africa Workshop in Abidjan, an NGO official rightly pointed out:  
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“We tend to forget that ASM is largely a poverty-driven activity, for people in remote areas 
who only have the resource available close by. We therefore need to look at the sector’s 
issues from a development perspective that takes into account poverty alleviation. In this 
regard, it is clear that forcibly removing illicit miners is not an effective strategy. It is 
essential, that mining regulation not only forbid unregulated mining, but also ensure that 
legal mining delivers enough benefits for miners and local communities to justify this 
choice” (ASM West Africa Report, 2017).  
 
These results and experiences raise another question, because why has the government of Côte 
d’Ivoire been unable to implement an effective ASM formalization strategy? In a region where 
many neighbouring countries have a long history of ASM reform agendas, one would expect the 
country to have learned from these experiences. In the next chapter this question will be answered, 
focussing on the political drive to formalize and the role of capacity.  
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Chapter 5 – An ineffective formal regulatory ASM framework 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the factors that have prevented the Government of Côte d’Ivoire from 
implementing an effective formal regulatory framework for the artisanal and small-scale gold 
mining sector. Since the adoption of the PNRO, little has changed in the country. ASM operations 
continue to contribute to the negative social and environmental impacts, the government loses 
large amounts of export and tax revenues of the ASM sector and no ASM operators have entered 
the formal domain. This raises the question, why? Based on experiences around the ASM West 
Africa Workshop,17 reports from the GoECDI and EPRM and interviews with numerous 
stakeholders in the field, an image is presented, that explains the context of why the government 
wanted to formalize the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector. Building on the argument of 
De Soto concerning the role of political drive in the effectiveness of any formalization process, a 
story is presented that can explain why the current formal regulatory framework is ineffective. 
Additionally, the role of the capacity of the government to adopt an effective formal regulatory 
framework is taken into account.  
 
5.2 The political drive to formalize ASM in Côte d’Ivoire  
 
To recapitulate, according to De Soto, without the full commitment of the government successful 
formalisation is very unlikely. The presence of political drive to formalize the ASM sector is 
therefore a crucial element in any formalization process. An absence of political drive by the 
government of Côte d’Ivoire to formalize the sector can explain why the formal regulatory 
framework is ineffective. So why was the formalization process initiated? Was the purpose of the 
PNRO to collect the missed tax revenues? Did the government want to create more jobs and 
exploit more gold through ASM operations? Or was formal regulatory framework focussed on 
decreasing the negative impacts of the sector? The previous chapter has presented an image of a 
government that was primarily concerned with decreasing the negative impacts of the sector. 
However, this information does not tell much about why there would be a lack of political drive in 
Côte d’Ivoire to formalize the ASM sector. As has been explained in the literature review, 
politicians privately benefitting from the informal status of the sector and the prioritization of large 
                                                   
17 A multi-stakeholder that was organized between 1-3 March 2017 in Abidjan “to discuss issues and opportunities 
relating to ASM in West Africa, learn from experiences elsewhere and share best practices”. The workshop was 
organized by PRADD, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the UK Embassy, the OECD 
and the MIM (Source: https://www.asmwestafrica.org/) 
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scale mining operations by a national government are determining factors of a lack of political drive 
to formalize the ASM sector in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
5.2.1 The Private control of Resources 
 
As described in the previous chapter, the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector did experience 
a strong growth during the political turmoil in the country from 1999-2011. During nine years the 
country was separated into a northern a southern part, with the north effectively being controlled 
by the Force Nouvelle (FN), a rebel movement headed by Guillaume Soro, the current President of 
the National Assembly. During this period the north was divided into multiple sub-zones headed 
by a commander or com’zones which was responsible for the security of that region and the collection 
of revenues. After the end of the political turmoil, the com’zones were removed and integrated into 
the army (Bavier, 2015). However, numerous reports by the GoECDI (2014-2016) indicate that 
some former com’zones took advantage of their position and still profit from “their warlord-style 
predatory economic activities, including the control of gold and diamond mines, smuggling cocoa, 
cotton and cashews, and levying illegal taxes on trade and transport (Bavier, 2015)”. One of these 
persons is Issiaka Ouattara or Wattao, who in January 2017 was promoted to Commander in Chief 
of the Republican Guard of Côte d’Ivoire. According to the reports, Wattao, together with three 
other political figures involved in the current Ivoirian Administration and the past Administration 
of Burkina Faso, controlled the artisanal gold mine of Gamina. The annual production of the illegal 
mine, where 15,800 diggers were active, would account for 13.8 percent of the annual official gold 
production of Côte d’Ivoire. While the mine of Gamina has been closed down, numerous other 
mines that are currently still active have been linked to his private control (GoECDI, 2016), like 
the mine ‘Doka’ in the region of Hire.18 According to the GoECDI, the incomes generated through 
the private control of illegal gold mines by Wattao enable him to maintain 500 armed elements, 
which mostly serve under the military as non-registered and pledge allegiance to him personally. 
The military strength of these private security forces allows Wattao “to secure undisputed control 
over illegal gold and diamond operations, […] thus jeopardizing the implementation of long-due 
formalization efforts and reforms of the Ivorian artisanal gold-mining sector and also depriving 
Co ̂te d’Ivoire of a significant source of revenue (GoECDI, 2015)”. “People with power and in 
power are benefiting from a status quo, which is an artisanal gold-mining supply chain that is 95-
100% illicit. You’re talking about large quantities of gold being produced, potentially rivalling that 
of large-scale actors (EPRM, 2016). The fact that currently still former com’zones privately profit 
                                                   
18 Own observations and interviews in Hire 
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from the control they built up during the political turmoil in Côte d’Ivoire, supports the argument 
made by Chabal and Daloz (1999). According to ‘the instrumentalization of disorder’ high raking 
politicians in Côte d’Ivoire lack the political drive to formalize the ASM sector, because they 
exercise their power on the base of the income they earn from the informal ASM production. A 
successful formalization of the sector would present a direct threat to these revenue streams. The 
findings of the GoECDI present direct evidence of government officials illegally benefitting from 
the illicit production and trade of gold in the country. While these findings have been presented to 
the UN Security Council in 2016, the recent promotion of Wattao early 2017 presents an image of 
a government that is unable to counter the power of those benefitting from the informal status of 
the gold sector. This presents a serious challenge of any formalization effort of the ASM sector 
made in the country.  
 
5.2.2 Large-scale mining prioritization  
 
But if there is a lack of political drive in the country to formalize the sector, why then has the 
PNRO been formulated? As explained in the previous chapter, the governments primary concern 
appears to be to decrease the negative impacts of the sector. However, this must be seen in the 
light of the adoption of the Mining Code of 2014. The new Mining Code was “aimed at enhancing 
mining investment in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly in the gold sector, and strengthening its 
contribution to local development (Dorin, 2015).” The new legislation included a removal of the 
additional profit tax and an extension of exploration permits from three to four years. The Mining 
Code particularly emphasizes local community development and environmental protection. While 
this approach has been successful in the attraction of new foreign mining companies, this has also 
resulted in the occupation of significant parts of land for the exploration and exploitation purposes 
of these mining companies. Exploitation and exploration permits in 2015 together count for 19,1 
percent of the total surface of Côte d’Ivoire in 201519, compare to Ghana which has a long mining 
history, where about 25 percent of the country has been reserved for mining purposes (Hilson, 
2017). In 2015, eight mining companies were operating and 163 prospect licences were handed out 
in Côte d’Ivoire, with permits reaching 400 km2 (EITI, 2015), compare to Tanzania where 
companies are granted areas as large as 150 km2 (Hilson, 2017). While in neighbouring countries 
like Burkina Faso overlap of land title is allowed between LSM and ASM operators, ASM operators 
in Côte d’Ivoire are according to law n°2014-138 obliged to undertake their activity in the “ASM 
corridors”. However, the areas that the government has identified for artisanal and small-scale gold 
                                                   
19 Own calculations, based on data from EITI (2015) 
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mining are not geologically viable (EPRM, 2016). Because more and more parcels are being sold 
to large scale mining companies, very little space is left for ASM miners to operate, putting the 
sector in a disadvantage to large scale mining companies. This increases the likelihood of ASM-
LSM conflicts, because the only choice ASM operators have is to mine on the exploration and 
exploitation ground of large scale mining companies. The prioritization of the large scale mining 
sector present another example of why the government would lack the political drive to formalize 
the ASM sector.  
 
5.2.3 External pressure 
 
Direct evidence of the government lacking the political drive to formalize the ASM sector is 
illustrated by the experiences around the organization of the ASM West Africa Workshop. In a 
response to the current state of ASM sector in Côte d’Ivoire, the workshop was organized. While 
the workshop was publicly presented as a regional focus, different informants explained that the 
workshop was explicitly organized to put pressure on the government to adopt a more effective 
formal regulatory ASM policy framework. The conference was used as a tool for non-specialist 
stakeholders to set the record straight on how ineffective the current approach of the government 
is regarding the ASM sector and as a platform of common vision for technical experts like the 
World Bank and the OECD. According to one informant, the MIM was very unwilling to organize 
the workshop and tried last-minute to change the date of the workshop in order to prevent the 
workshop from happening. Due to pressure of different mining companies on the MIM, the 
government was finally pushed to organize the workshop.20 While in public the MIM presented 
the organization of the conference as a regional effort to improve the governance of the ASM 
sector, these experiences indicate that in fact the government needed to be pushed to discuss ASM 
best practices and learn from the multi-stakeholder’s expertise in the field.  These findings support 
the idea of an absence of political drive by the government to formalize the sector.  
 
In summary, two factors are identified that can explain the lack of political drive to formalize the 
ASM sector. The private control of informal ASM mines by high ranking politicians can explain 
why these actors would not want to formalize the sector and therefore presents a serious challenge 
in any successful formalization attempt in the country. Also the prioritization of large scale mining 
in the policy framework explains why there is little political drive to formalize the sector. The 
absence of political drive is illustrated by the MIM not wanting to organize the ASM West Africa 
                                                   
20 Interview with a consultant (21/02/17) 
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Workshop. Interestingly enough, it was the private sector that had to convince the government of 
the importance of such workshop, while the prioritization of large scale mining in the country is 
one of the factors that can explain why the ASM sector is in its current state.  
 
5.3 Capacity 
 
Finally, a factor that does appear to influence the effectiveness of the formal regulatory framework, 
but is not taken into account by De Soto’s argument is the question whether the government was 
actually able to enforce the adopted legislation. As Van Bockstael (2014) explains, this is rarely 
considered to be a relevant factor determining the level of informality of ASM operations. 
However, different indications support this understanding for Côte d’Ivoire. According to the 
Directeur Général of the MIM, one of the most important challenges during the implementation of 
the PNRO was the translation of policy from the national to the local level. “One of the most 
severe challenges we face is the transmission of technical expertise from the national level to the 
local level. Informing everybody on all levels of implementation remains challenging”.21 According 
to one local Préfect from Tengrela in the northernmost region of Côte d’Ivoire, there is a need for 
better coordination, especially in terms of a regional approach. “Illegal miners simply disappear 
across the border, only to come back shortly afterwards (ASM West Africa Report, 2017).” A local 
employee of a mining company in Hire explains that as part of the PNRO a technical committee 
has been installed in the village, but nobody knows why it is there nor what it is doing. He also 
explains that within the MIM, people at lower ranks do not dare to speak up, afraid of being 
transferred to remote regions in the country or losing their job. 22 This creates a hyper positive 
image of the implementation process of the PNRO. Consequently, the fear from local civil servants 
to criticize the effectiveness and implementation of the policy framework prevents the MIM from 
learning from their mistakes. In a response to the question why the government has not licensed 
artisanal gold miners and why gold buying houses have not exported a single ounce, the MIM only 
stated that “the government was presently undertaking the necessary actions, and would require 
sufficient time to implement these (ASM West Africa Report, 2017)”. While the PNRO consisted 
of five different phases to be implemented over the period 2013-2016, the government has only 
been able to reach the third phase. These experiences present an image of a Ministry that did not 
possess the right capacity to implement the adopted formalization strategy. Especially the schism 
between the national and local level appears to play an important role in where things go wrong. 
                                                   
21 Interview Directeur Général Coulibaly – MIM (24/03/17) 
22 Interview with mining company employee (22/03/2017) 
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Ineffective communication in both directions prevents the MIM from implementing an effective 
formalization strategy for ASM. According to one expert, part of the problem is how the MIM is 
organized. “You cannot expect a geologist at the MIM to have a sensitive eye for the wider socio-
economic development issues and extra social costs in the context of ASM. From his point of view, 
a ban on ASM might make sense, while the broader costs of social rural development are of course 
much higher” 23. Therefore, it is likely that a reorganisation of the MIM, where the governance of 
the ASM sector is part of the Ministry that is responsible for rural development, will result in the 
formulation of a formal regulatory framework that is more effective.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
In a response to the question why the government of Côte d’Ivoire adopted a policy framework 
that was ineffective in regulating the ASM sector, different factors have been identified. The 
absence of political drive can be explained by two factors. Firstly, evidence of high ranking 
politicians currently active in the government and still benefitting from the informal gold 
production and trade presents a direct challenge towards any formalization attempt. This factor is 
reinforced by the prioritization of large scale mining in Côte d’Ivoire. The ambition to attract more 
foreign mining companies by the government, has resulted in the marginalization of ASM in the 
formal regulatory framework. This leaves very little space for ASM miners, forcing them to operate 
on the exploration and exploitation ground of large scale mining companies, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of LSM-ASM conflicts. The current situation in Côte d’Ivoire, is that of a government 
facing the consequences of a neglected ASM sector in the formal regulatory framework. Given that 
this situation is untenable, external pressure by both the private sector as well as international 
stakeholders is rising. The question is however, if the government is able to respond to these 
demands. Different indications support the idea that next to a lack of political drive a lack of 
capacity is also an important factor of why the current approach has been so ineffective. However, 
if this is the case, it is crucial that the government of Côte d’Ivoire opens its doors to learn from 
external technical expertise.   
 
                                                   
23 Interview with ASM expert Côte d’Ivoire (09/02/17) 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions, discussion and recommendations 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis was to broaden understanding of the ASM formalisation experience in 
Côte d’Ivoire with special emphasis on how the formal regulatory framework for ASM, the PNRO, 
is connected to the informal status of the sector in the country. This has been done by answering 
the main research question “What approach has been taken to formalise ASM in Côte d’Ivoire, 
and why is this approach (in)effective?”. In order to answer the main research question, a 
theoretical framework has been constructed, build on the ideas of the Legalist school of thought, 
to explain how the formal regulatory framework for ASM is connected to the informal status of 
the sector in sub-Saharan Africa. Most important concepts in the analysis were the narrow 
understanding of formalisation, the role of bureaucracy and costs, political drive and the capacity 
of the government.  
 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
The research has presented different findings. Firstly, due to a long period of political instability 
and a high international gold price, the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector has experienced 
a strong growth over the 1999-2011 period in Côte d’Ivoire. In a response to the strong growth 
and the negative social and environmental impacts of the sector the government of Côte d’Ivoire 
presented the PNRO in 2013 for the effective regulation of the sector. While the program was 
aimed to end in 2016, the implementation of the process is still ongoing. The direct results of the 
program and experiences of different stakeholder in the field present an image of a formal 
regulatory framework that was ineffective: no (or very limited) authorisations have been handed 
out, no geologically viable ASM corridors have been identified and the negative impacts of the 
ASM sector, including LSM-ASM conflicts, have not decreased. 
 
Different factors have been identified that can explain why the current formalization strategy of 
the government of Côte d’Ivoire is ineffective. Firstly, the adopted formalization strategy is too 
narrow in its focus. The ad-hoc implementation makes it more difficult for ASM operators, that 
already face hard working conditions, to join the formal economy. Also, the one-sided focus on 
the legal side of formalization, does not enable people to become legally active. ASM operators 
indicate that they need more assistance in order to join the formal economy, like an explanation of 
which steps they need to take to become legally active. Finally, a limited understanding of the 
sector’s different dimensions has resulted in a formal regulatory framework that does not address 
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the livelihood needs of ASM operators. The absence of zones reserved for the purpose of ASM 
leaves miners no other choice than to continue to operate in the informal sector. These factors are 
characteristics of a narrow understanding of formalization by the government of Côte d’Ivoire. 
Secondly, while very limited information is available on the different bureaucratic steps and costs 
that an ASM operator faces in order to obtain an authorisation, the absence of this data indicates 
that the process is cumbersome. Also the fact that no or very limited legal artisanal and small-scale 
gold mining takes place in Côte d’Ivoire supports this understanding. This is a second factor that 
can explain why the current approach of the government is ineffective. In an answer to the 
question, why the government of Côte d’Ivoire has been unable to implement an effective ASM 
formalization strategy, two factors are identified. Firstly, there is a lack of political drive in the 
country to formalize the sector. This can be explained by direct evidence of high ranking politicians 
privately benefitting from the informal status of the ASM sector and the prioritization of large scale 
mining in the country. These factors present a serious challenge in the success of the 
implementation of any formalization strategy in the country. Finally, different indications support 
the idea that a limited capacity of the government of Côte d’Ivoire to implement the adopted 
agenda have prevented the MIM from successfully implementing an effective formal regulatory 
framework. Especially the schism between the national and local level in presence of the right 
information and expertise appears to be a problem.   
 
6.3 Conclusion 
Answering the main research question of this thesis, a formalization approach in Côte d’Ivoire has 
been taken that was too narrow in its focussed and primarily concerned with mapping and 
controlling an illegal activity, rather than that it contributed to an effective formalization of the 
sector. This narrow focus, together with the bureaucratic procedures and costs to obtain an 
authorisation, the private control of informal gold mines by high ranking politicians, the 
prioritization of large scale mining and a lack of capacity by the government, have contributed to 
the design and implementation of an ineffective formal regulatory framework for the artisanal and 
small-scale gold mining sector in the country. A consequence of this, is that with the current 
approach the sector is deemed to stay informal and increases the likelihood of ASM-LSM conflicts. 
This scenario is unwanted, because it leaves the ones that most need an effective regulatory 
framework left in informality, it increases problems with insecurity for mining companies and 
creates a huge losses of tax revenues for the government. The sole actors that profit from an 
informal ASM sector are the ones that benefit from the illicit trade of gold.  
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6.4 Discussion 
So, what can be learned from these findings? On a theoretical level, a revisiting of the ideas of the 
Legalist school of thought and specifically the ideas of Hernando De Soto has provided different 
insights. While a formalization strategy that is based on a Legalist understanding and fits the narrow 
understanding, will likely to be ineffective, the ideas of Hernando De Soto prove to be insightful 
in explaining how a formal regulatory framework is connected to the informal economy. These 
findings are not only important on a theoretical level, but can also help policy makers to formulate 
a more effective formalization strategy for ASM in sub-Saharan Africa. This means that the 
bureaucratic procedures and costs to obtain an authorisation must gain specific attention in the 
design of an ASM formalization strategy. Also the political drive to formalize the sector must be 
identified in order to understand how likely a successful formalization will be. In case of a lack of 
political drive, political pressure by different stakeholders in the field might prove to be effective 
to create the necessary policy overhaul. A second finding, that reinforces the point made by Van 
Bockstael (2014), is the importance of the capacity of a government as a determining factor for the 
successful formalization of the ASM sector in sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that this factor 
deserves more attention within the academic debate. 
   
On a practical level, the findings support the idea of the importance of a thorough understanding 
of the sector specific dimensions of ASM in the design and implementation of an effective 
formalization strategy. Given that very limited information about the sector is available in the 
country, much terrain can be won here. Examples are a national census on the size and revenue 
streams of the sector and a better consultation of ASM communities in the design of the policy 
framework. In terms of capacity, the government should improve the quality of communication 
and consultation between the national and local level to improve the effectiveness of the 
implementation of the policy framework. Rather than starting from the top, the formalization 
approach should start from the bottom.  
 
So what lays ahead? One of the key messages of the ASM West Africa Workshop was that the 
“international standards and regulation are fast evolving and the principles of risk management, 
traceability and due diligence, as codified by the OECD Due Diligence Guidance and upcoming 
EU Supply Chain Due Diligence Regulation, are quickly becoming the norm globally” (ASM West 
Africa Report). Consequently, in order to prevent being shut out of international supply chains, 
countries in West Africa need to meet international due diligence standards. A successful 
formalisation of the ASM sector in each country in the region is a crucial aspect of meeting these 
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standards. These developments increase the external pressure on the government of Côte d’Ivoire 
to adopt an effective formal regulatory ASM framework. The increased external pressure by 
stakeholders along the supply chain to push the government of Côte d’Ivoire to adopt a more 
effective ASM formalization strategy, might create the momentum that is according to De Soto 
deemed necessary for a successful policy overhaul. However, as one informant explained: 
 
 …A policy framework that was designed due to external pressure has a higher risk of not 
being fully reinforced at all levels of the implementation. The implementation is less likely 
to trickle down into the local levels of the country, because this external pressure is only 
reaching the top.24  
 
In the end, a successful formalization very much depends on how the national formal regulatory 
framework is translated to the local level. It is therefore really the understanding of the Government 
of Côte d’Ivoire towards the need for formalization that should determine the political drive to 
formalize the ASM sector; external pressure is only a means to achieve this.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                   
24 Interview with GIZ employee (02/02/2017) 
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ANNEX I – Fieldtrip locations  
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ANNEX II – Interview outline with local government official 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date : Bouaflé, 10/03/17 
 
Entretien avec le Secrétaire général du département de Bouaflé 
 
Situation actuelle 
1.! Quelle est l'importance de l'activité de l’orpaillage dans votre région ? 
2.! Si vous deviez décrire les problèmes les plus importants du secteur dans votre région, 
quels seraient-ils ? 
3.! Quel est l'effet positif de l’orpaillage dans votre région ? 
4.! Depuis combien de temps l'orpaillage est-il actif dans votre région ? 
5.! Avez-vous connu des changements dans votre région depuis le début de l'activité de 
l’orpaillage ? (Population, Activité commerciale, Criminalité, Prix, etc.) 
6.! Dans l'affirmative, que qualifieriez-vous de changement positif et de changement négatif ? 
7.! Quelles sont les principales raisons pour lesquelles les gens travaillent dans le secteur de 
l’orpaillage ? 
 
Autorités local vs orpaillage  
8.! Comment décririez-vous la relation entre le préfecture et l’orpaillage dans votre région ? 
9.! Décririez-vous cela comme une bonne ou comme une mauvaise relation ? Et pourquoi ? 
10.!Est-ce une relation différente que dans d'autres parties du pays ? 
11.!Quels sont les conflits entre les autorités local et l’orpailleurs le plus souvent ? 
12.!Comment l'activité de l’orpaillage est-elle tolérée dans votre région ? 
 
La politique de rationalisation de l’orpaillage (PNRO) 
13.!Comment la politique de PNRO a-t-elle eu un impact sur votre région ? 
14.!Quel est l'état actuel de cette politique dans votre région ? 
15.!Quels ont été les résultats jusqu'ici de la politique adoptée dans votre région ? 
16.!La politique a-t-elle contribué à une meilleure réglementation du secteur ? 
17.!Quel est selon vous les points positifs de l’actuelle réglementation du secteur de 
l’orpaillage ? 
18.!Quel est selon vous les points négatif de l’actuelle réglementation du secteur de 
l’orpaillage ? 
19.!Quel type de suggestion pourriez-vous faire pour une meilleure réglementation du secteur 
de l’orpaillage ? 
20.!Êtes-vous membre du Comité Technique Local?  
21.!Pouvez-vous m'expliquer les activités Comité Technique Local? 
22.!Quelle est l'étape la plus difficile dans une meilleure organisation du secteur ? 
23.!Si vous deviez identifier les défis dans le processus de formalisation de l’orpaillage en 
Côte d'Ivoire, que pourriez-vous identifier ? 
 
Informations complémentaires 
24.!Recommanderiez-vous d'autres personnes / contacts avec qui je devrais parler ? 
25.!Recommanderiez-vous d'autres documents que je devrais lire ? 
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26.!Avez-vous d'autres questions concernant l'étude ou souhaitez-vous faire d'autres 
commentaires ? 
 
Merci beaucoup pour votre temps 
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ANNEX III – Research outline field trip Angovia and Hire 
 
Les objectifs  
 
1.! Comprendre les incitations des orpailleurs à travailler dans l'exploitation minière 
artisanale 
2.! Découvrir ce qui a été le résultat de la politique de rationalisation de l’orpaillage dans le 
région d’Angovia/Hire 
3.! Comprendre la relation entre les orpailleurs et les 
a.! Entreprises minières 
b.! Autorités locales 
c.! Communautés locales 
4.! Obtenir un aperçu de l'impact de l'activité de l’orpaillage sur la région 
a.! Social 
b.! Économique 
 
Les cibles potentielles  L’objectif 
Secteur de l’orpaillage    
"! L’orpailleur 
o! Creuseurs 
o! Concasseurs  
o! Laveurs, etc.  
"! Propriétaires du terrain 
"! Chef des mines  
"! Les financiers des mines  
"! Acheteurs d’or/comptoirs 
 
L’objectif à atteindre lorsqu’on visite une 
mine se situe à trois niveaux : 
1.! Pour mieux comprendre les 
incitations des orpailleurs à travailler 
dans les mines 
2.! Pour connaître les problèmes auxquels 
les orpailleurs sont actuellement 
confrontés 
3.! Pour savoir le taux de connaissance 
des orpailleurs concernant le 
programme national pour la 
rationalisation de l'orpaillage (PNRO) 
Ces informations peuvent contribuer à une 
meilleure organisation du secteur à l'avenir et 
à l'adoption d'une meilleure stratégie de 
sensibilisation des organisations de la société 
civile de la région. 
Autorité locale     L’objectif d’un entretien avec les autorités 
locales de Hire/Angovia est d'entendre leur 
point de vue sur l'état actuel du PNRO dans 
la région. Cette connaissance peut beaucoup 
attribuer à une meilleure compréhension de la 
façon dont le secteur de l’orpaillage peut être 
mieux organisé. Il est également important de 
déterminer s'il existe des différences d'idées 
entre les autorités locales au niveau régional et 
au niveau local sur le PNRO. Il est essentiel 
d'entendre les perspectives et les expériences 
des autorités locales pour améliorer les 
structures de gouvernance actuelle. Une 
réunion peut donc être très précieuse. 
Population locale    Entendre les perspectives de la population 
locale sur l’orpaillage, peut contribuer à une 
meilleure compréhension de l'impact de 
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l'activité sur la région. Obtenir un aperçu de 
l'impact de l'activité sur la région peut aider à 
comprendre la nécessité d'une meilleure 
réglementation du secteur.    
Représentants des entreprises minières  L’objectif d’un entretien avec les entreprises 
minières est de comprendre leur relation avec 
les orpailleurs. Il est important de savoir quels 
problèmes existent actuellement entre les 
sociétés minières et les orpailleurs et d'écouter 
les perspectives des sociétés minières sur ce 
qui pourrait permettre de surmonter ces 
problèmes. Aussi, sommes-nous attirés par la 
vision des sociétés minières sur le potentiel 
d'une future collaboration entre orpailleur et 
les sociétés minières. 
 
La période de la visite (7-10 jours, par exemple 7 – 15 Mars) 
 
07/03/2017, mardi Départ pour Angovia 
08/03/2017, mercredi Entretiens avec les autorités locales 
09/03/2017, jeudi Entretiens avec des sociétés minières 
10/03/2017, vendredi Visite de la mine 
11/03/2017, samedi Visite de la mine 
12/03/2017, dimanche Départ pour Hiré 
13/03/2017, lundi Visite de la mine 
14/03/2017, mardi Entretiens avec des sociétés 
minières/autorités locales 
15/03/2017, mercredi Départ pour Abidjan 
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ANNEX IV – Letter to the Minister of Industries and Mines 
 
 
Titus Sauerwein 
MA Etudes Africaines 
Université de Leyde (Pays-Bas) 
Email: titussau@hotmail.com 
Tel.: 88892670 
 
 
 
Dr. Jean-Claude BROU 
Ministre de l’Industrie et des Mines 
République de Côte d’Ivoire 
 
 
Abidjan, vendredi le 17 Mars 2017 
 
 
Objet : Recherche sur l’orpaillage à Cote d’Ivoire 
 
 
Monsieur le Ministre, 
 
 
Dans le cadre de mon Master Etudes Africaines à l'Université de Leyde aux Pays-Bas, je fais trois 
mois de recherches en Côte d'Ivoire. Mes recherches portent sur les défis du processus de 
formalisation de l'exploitation aurifère artisanale à petite échelle en Côte d'Ivoire et portent une 
attention particulière sur le PNRO 2014-2016. 
 
Lors de la conférence ‘ASM West Africa’, qui a été organisée par votre ministère, l'importance de 
l'interaction entre les sociétés minières et l’artisanat minier a été soulignée comme une étape cruciale 
dans la formalisation. Par conséquent, je suis très intéressé à entrer en contact avec différentes 
grandes sociétés minières en Côte d'Ivoire qui ont des activités des artisans miniers sur leurs sites. 
Je vous écris cette lettre pour demander votre aide pour organiser ce contact et obtenir une 
autorisation officielle pour une visite. Si possible j’aimerais discuter avec votre ministère la semaine 
prochaine, parce que mon temps est limité. A ce moment, je pourrais vous donner un aperçu des 
résultats obtenus á mi-parcours dans ma recherche en Côte d’Ivoire. Je suis joignable en tout 
moment au numéro 88892670. 
 
En espérant une suite favorable à ma demande, je vous prie d’agréer Monsieur le Ministre 
l’expression de ma très haute considération. 
 
 
 
 
Titus Sauerwein 
 
 
 
 

